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provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards.
In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD's work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan,
coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the
Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since 1964, Mozambique has lived through three distinct conflict situations—the 196475 fight for independence from Portugal, the 1976-79 aggression by Rhodesian forces
during Mozambique’s support to Zimbabwe, and the 1980-992 conflict between the
FRELIMO government and the rebel RENAMO forces supported by apartheid South
Africa. As a result, Mozambique’s mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
contamination is complex; it combines large minefields around key infrastructure,
defensive minefields around military installations, and a large number of small
minefields and ERW that are randomly scattered around the country.
The response to Mozambique’s contamination officially began in 1992, when the UN
Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), primarily charged to lead the peace process,
was also mandated to manage demining operations. However, due to various internal
complications, ONUMOZ did not initiate demining operations until mid-1994, five
months before the mission’s end. In the meantime, the vacuum was filled by
international NGO operators such as Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and HALO Trust, as
well as UN agencies such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA), which, together with UNDP, trained and employed 400 Mozambican deminers
as part of the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP). With the creation of the
National Demining Commission (Comissao Nacional de Desminagem; CND), in 1995, as
an entity that seemed to combine, yet distinguish between the functions of a mine
action authority and a mine action centre, Mozambique seemed to take an important
step towards owning the national mine action programme. However, it remained under
funded and poorly staffed, and all of its few uncoordinated capacity development
efforts yielded no concrete results.
In 1999, in response to its poor performance, the CND was replaced by the National
Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem; IND), a semi-autonomous
statutory body reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. IND was in charge of
proposing polices and strategies, coordinating mine action activities, developing
standards and mobilising resources. But since most of the funding came through
operators, it remained virtually independent, choosing where and how to use its funds.
This certainly weakened IND’s ownership and management of mine action as a whole,
but did not hinder its progress in developing capacity in partnership with UNDP and
others. Similar to what happened when ONUMOZ left in 1994, the end of the ADP
highlighted IND’s (and the Mozambican government’s) lack of authority over mine
action in the country. Conceived as a temporary project, rather than as a programme of
international assistance to a national mine action authority, the ADP lacked a transition
component. There were no national entities able to define relevant policies, take
command and effectively manage the mine action programme. For this reason, rather
than a planned transition, IND experienced an improvised, ad hoc effort to fill the gap
left. And although IND’s staff is performing better and gaining more access to
discretionary resources, its authority over operators remains limited.

INTRODUCTION
Mozambique shares its borders with six countries and has a 2,500 km coastline on the
Indian Ocean to the east. It has 22.4 million inhabitants and 800,000 km2 of land.
The country is divided into ten provinces which are grouped into three regions:
•
•
•

north (three provinces)
centre (four provinces)
south (three provinces)1, with the capital Maputo located at the southernmost
tip

Despite impressive economic growth rates, due mainly to a handful of mega projects,
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with some 55 per cent of its
population living in absolute poverty. The country is heavily dependent on donor
assistance in the form of projects, and also directly, for about half the national budget.
This dependence has meant that the Bretton Woods institutions and donors have
considerable influence on the government’s policies and programmes.
The Mozambique population have lived through three distinct conflict situations:
•
•
•

the 1964-1975 fight for independence from Portugal
the 1976-79 aggression by Rhodesian forces when Mozambique supported
Zimbabwe’s fight for independence
the 1980-1992 conflict between the FRELIMO government and the rebel
RENAMO forces supported by apartheid South Africa

All of these factors have affected the nature of minefield contamination and how it has
been tackled. Because of these conflicts, there are:
•
•
•

a combination of large minefields around key infrastructure
defensive minefields around military installations and some settlements
a large number of small, scattered minefields and UXO

This means that the logistics of surveys, clearance, quality assurance (QA) and
explosives ordnance destruction (EOD) are complex and time-consuming.

1

Mine action is an exception – the central Zambézia province is combined with the north, making up all the country
north of the Zambezi river that was HALO’s operational area.
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME:
THE START-UP PHASE 1992-1995

Between 1992 and 1994, the UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) led a peace
process. At this time the government was weak, and the UN and the donors were the
key players. What happened then determined how the mine situation would be tackled
thereafter and how the institutional capacity to coordinate and manage the programme
would evolve.
A few months into the peace process, the UN prepared a demining plan. It focused on:
a) demining as a military, operational issue; using commercial companies to
speedily verify roads and carry out clearance
b) building on national mine clearance capacity
In the end however, ONUMOZ demining began only in June 1994, five months before its
mandate ended. This happened because:
•
•
•

approving the plan was delayed
there were conflicts between the UN and donors over whom to award the
commercial contracts
the contracting process itself was lengthy

In the meantime, the vacuum was filled by bilateral donor funding for commercial and
international non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators.
In 1993, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) began working in the three central provinces of
Tete, Manica and Sofala, with Norwegian funding. In 1994, HALO Trust began working in
central Zambézia province with UK funding, and rapidly expanded to the three northern
provinces. The indigenous capacity component of the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plan involved the training of 400 deminers, and a UNDP
project, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP), was launched to employ them. As
HALO was in the north and NPA in the centre, ADP started operations in the three
southern provinces in October 1994.
In mid-1994, with a view to establishing post-ONUMOZ capacity, the UN suggested a
set-up along the lines of the Cambodian model, with:
•

an inter-ministerial authority as the governing oversight entity

2

•

a national mine action centre (MAC), with an operational wing that would
intervene directly, coordinate and plan

However, concerns were raised, that it would be a top-heavy, expensive, para-statal
replication of the work already being done by operators on the ground. The issue was
still left unresolved when ONUMOZ came to an end in late 1994, leaving an institutional
vacuum.
In the end, the transition was unprepared, ad hoc and unorganised. There were no
national entities able to take command of an effective mine action programme, define
overall policy, or direct, coordinate and manage the programme.
INITIAL CONSOLIDATION (1995-1999) AND MATURATION (19952004) PHASES, AND TRANSITION TO UNDP
INITIAL CONSOLIDATION PHASE: 1995-1999 NATIONAL DEMINING
COMMISSION (COMISSAO NACIONAL DE DESMINAGEM (CND) 1995-1999)

For some six months after ONUMOZ’s arrival, there was no national mine action body,
but it did not seem to hamper the work of HALO, NPA or ADP. They continued to
mobilise their own resources and self-regulate, with individual plans and priorities
reflecting their different corporate cultures. There was little or no communication
between them.
In May 1995, the government created the National Demining Commission (Comissao
Nacional de Desminagem; CND) under the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation,
as an entity that seemed to combine, yet distinguish between, the functions of a mine
action authority and a mine action centre. The function of the former was handled by a
“policy-making arm” made up of several ministries.2 The mine action centre element,
including data collection, clearance planning, establishing procedures, monitoring and
coordinating demining activities, and licensing and tendering functions, was to be taken
care of in the Executive Director’s office. However, it was poorly staffed, and the few
disjointed capacity-building efforts (which took two and a half years and cost some USD
3 million), had limited effects.
Operators continued to receive donor funding and consolidate their positions during
1995-1999. Meanwhile, Mozambique became one of the first countries to sign and
ratify the Ottawa Convention (in 1997 and 1998 respectively). In 1998, Handicap
International started humanitarian demining in Inhambane province.

2

Ministries of Economy, Finance, Home Affairs and Defence, with Health, Labour and Social Affairs as occasional
members.
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MATURATION PHASE 1999-2004/5: NATIONAL DEMINING INSTITUTE
(INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DESMINAGEM – IND)

In June 1999, the CND was replaced by the National Demining Institute (Instituto
Nacional de Desminagem; IND), a semi-autonomous statutory body run by a director
reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This meant that the tentative
“policy-making arm”, the committee that might have performed something of an
authority function, disappeared and was replaced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The IND was in charge of:
•
•
•
•
•
•

proposing policies and strategies
proposing and executing plans
facilitating coordination, management and control of mine action activity
developing standards
mobilising resource
maintaining the IMSMA database and quality assurance

It also had a corresponding departmental structure.3 It later established regional offices
in the north and centre of the country. It had a management committee made up of
department heads and a technical council, with representatives from ministries with the
greatest interest in mine action4. It was responsible for organising annual meetings with
operators, donors and other stakeholders.
Within a year there were a number of significant developments:
•

•
•
•

2000 – launch of a UNDP capacity-building project, with a six-person technical
advisory (TA) team, which helped provide the IND with a solid framework and
basic working tools and procedures
2001 – a one-year UNDP mine action flood-related emergency project
2001 – publication of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) report
2001 – initiatives to transform ADP into a national NGO or mine action clearance
agency

In addition, the German operator MgM arrived in 2000, the US Department of Defense
helped build the army’s demining capacity, and the commercial operator, RONCO,
received US funding to establish a “quick reaction demining force” (QRDF) of
Mozambican deminers who, when not deployed overseas, worked in the centre and

3

Studies/planning /information, operations, international relations as well as the “business” departments of
administration/finance and human resources
4
Nothing akin to National Mine Action Authority, this is a consultative body that gives opinions on annual reports and
plans or other matters, when requested to do so by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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south of the country. IND also tried to encourage the creation of Mozambican
commercial operators.
Within a short time, it was recognised that, albeit with difficulty, the IND was
performing somewhat better than its predecessor and its capacity was improving.
Donor support for demining increased considerably, and IND presented its first multiyear plan 2002-2006, based on the LIS. The aim was to achieve “mine impact free
status” by 2006, by clearing all high and medium impact sites.
Despite these advances, there were still some major problems on the horizon.
THE OPERATORS
HUMANITARIAN DEMINING OPERATORS
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP): transition from UN to indigenous
capacity

In June 1994, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) was established as a UNDP
project to employ deminers trained by peacekeepers, but with little thought to its
future. ADP existed as a UNDP project in two phases (1994-2000 and 2000-2005) and
operated in the three southern provinces.
It received considerable donor funding, channelled through UNDP, as well as technical
advisory support, mainly from military advisors from Australian and New Zealand, and it
benefited from several overseas specialist training courses. ADP had a training centre in
Moamba, Maputo province that eventually became the main capacity-building source
for operators in Mozambique; providing basic, refresher and specialist courses. It also
sent personnel for service overseas.5
In March 2001, when it still had five technical advisors, a new UNDP project attempted
to address ADP’s future. The “transformation of ADP into an NGO” project document
was referred to in ADP reports as the “transition document”. The objective was
“support for national capacity” by producing a “fully operational national NGO”.
Although the objectives and outputs of the project document cover solely the
transformation process, the text refers to a mine action budget of USD 4 million a year,
so mine action activities continued (the final expenditure for the period was at least
USD 6.35 million – see Annex 1). Indeed, according to ADP, the project document was a
“strategic document”, with strategic objectives “based upon an external requirement”
and, as such, did not allow stakeholders to assess ADP’s “institutional development”
5

According to the ADP 2004 report: Lebanon, Guinea Bissau, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Eritrea, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq, Croatia, Azerbaijan and Angola.
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activities. ADP, therefore, produced its own operational project document, containing
mine action objectives, outputs, activities and indicators;6 it also submitted two types of
reports to UNDP: strategic and operational.
As progress on transforming ADP into a local NGO was minimal, this meant that what
was happening on the ground did not reflect what was outlined in the official UNDP
project document. Evidence suggests that UNDP went along with this, as it continued to
channel demining funds to ADP.
The “transition” effort by both parties appears to have been weak. The main output was
a May 2002 consultancy report which concluded that an NGO option was not viable.7
When the study’s findings were presented to a donor stakeholder meeting in November
2002,8 the participants reportedly concurred and decided on “more of the same”9 (ie
that UNDP, IND and ADP should develop a proposal for the establishment of a UNDP
NEX10 project under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
In 2003, ADP still had two technical advisors and USD 2.1 million for operations.
However, its status was uncertain, and the perception that the mine threat was “not so
serious”, made more hesitant. An added financial concern was that by changing its
status from a UNDP project to an NGO, ADP would have to pay its staff some USD 1.8
million in immediate compensation.11
However, it appears that the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not agree with the proposal,
so a new project document12 was issued for the period July 2004 to June 2005. The
objective was to establish a “legal framework”13 that would allow ADP to exist as a
“non-profit making demining operator”. It would take the form of an association of
senior ADP staff, and be known as the “Associated Demining Programme”. Work
proceeded with the appointment of a governing board, preparation of the required staff
establishment for national coverage and the drafting of a strategy and vision documents
The process was halted, however, by events in early 2005, when frustrated deminers
went on strike for non-payment of wages. ADP’s director resigned and, by June, ADP
6

None of this was mentioned in the official ProDoc signed by the UNDP Res Rep, the IND Director and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.
7
The former ADP director noted that this would have been evident if a minimum of effort had gone into preparing
the project document. There was clearly only minimal preparation with no kind of needs assessment.
8
It has not been possible to consult the minutes of the meeting.
9
This was based on the report’s option 4: “Keep ADP as a project and redefine its institutional relationship with IND
and other government institutions.”
10
National Execution – implemented by the government on the basis of annual work plans and quarterly
disbursements, as is the case with the current UNDP small arms/mine action project
11
This would be severance payment from ADP as a UNDP project, in line with Mozambique’s provisions for
termination of employment. It appears that UNDP never registered ADP personnel as employees; so did not make
mandatory contributions into the social security system to cover termination payments.
12
ProDoc not available, current information taken from 2004 ADP report.
13
Not new legislation, more like legal documentation
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had collapsed. Compensation, including the legally-mandated severance payments, was
eventually paid to the retrenched deminers through contributions from UNDP (USD
400,000) and Ireland (Euro 250,000), with the government of Mozambique covering the
balance of some USD 1.1 million.14
Although ADP was, according to IND, recognised as being very engaged and carrying out
quality work,15 very few of their demining activities were recorded in IMSMA. There is
no conclusive evidence to say if this was due to difficulties with IND’s database unit or a
lack of reporting on ADP’s side. The former ADP director insists that he always sent the
required task and clearance information to IND, but the whereabouts of ADP’s own
demining database – or the original documents – is unclear.
Why did this happen? How could these deminers not have been used as a national force
for the final push for compliance with Mozambique’s mine clearance obligations,
instead of working for a foreign operator? There are many opinions. Contributing
factors appear to have been personality clashes, intra-governmental intrigue, IND
concern that ADP wanted to take it over by becoming its operational wing, donor
reluctance, opposition by the international operators, government disinterest, the
compensation problem and all the complications of the crisis years – when ADP was
both a contributor and a victim. It is, however, clear that ADP was a UNDP project, and
so was partially responsible for what happened.
HALO Trust

In mid-1993, the HALO Trust was hired by ONUMOZ to do the first rapid survey of the
landmine situation throughout the country. In February 1994 the HALO trust supported
three British humanitarian NGOs in demining in the central Zambézia province, and then
soon expanded north to Niassa in 1995, Cabo Delgado in 1996 and Nampula in 199716,
covering 48 per cent of the country’s area and more than half its population. In 1998 it
felt that it could complete these provinces by 2003, and was contemplating training and
leaving behind small “fire brigades” to deal with residual problems. However, after
deciding to do full clearance the end date was put back to around 2007 and the fire
brigade idea dropped.
HALO’s priority was to roughly assess areas, based on humanitarian concerns and
development and infrastructure plans (government or commercial), and the provincial
government was to approve the overall demining plan. Operating in the entire country
14

However, the story did not quite end there, In January 2006 the Price Waterhouse Coopers company produced a
“Final Report – Facilitation of a Business Plan for Associated Demining Project” funded by UNDP and there was news
that the Associated Demining Project had been registered. However, it was never heard of again.
15
The fact that the former ADP director is now a RONCO consultant organising assignments in half a dozen countries
for up to 400 Mozambican deminers, most of them former ADP employees, suggests the organisation was capable.
16
Financed by DFID, Ireland, Switzerland and USA/Netherlands respectively.
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north of the Zambezi river, with no presence to speak of in the capital, HALO’s contacts
with IND were minimal, other than sending information for the IMSMA database and
attending operator meetings.
Before leaving, HALO was to carry out a Mine Impact Free District (MIFD) survey of the
four provinces. However, HALO did not leave as planned, but rather was asked by IND to
conduct a baseline assessment of the remaining six provinces. It is now working in
Maputo, Manica and Tete provinces.
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

NPA was for many years heavily engaged in rural development projects in the three
central provinces of Tete, Manica and Sofala. In 1994, it decided to start demining
operations that would be closely linked to its rural development work.
NPA’s priorities were different to HALO’s, in that they were linked to its rural
development background. One of NPA’s principles was linking demining to
humanitarian wellbeing, and clearance was often followed by a local development
initiative. NPA’s survey method (task impact assessment) focused on the increased
production and income that was generated by clearing a certain hazard.
In 2004, NPA announced that it would stop demining operations in Mozambique. This
was linked to the fact that the Norwegian embassy had made the decision to stop
funding humanitarian mine action in Mozambique after noting that under the 20022006 IND strategy, all mined areas would be identified by 2006, and all high and
medium impact areas cleared. Based on its own experience, NPA must have known that
this was not going to be the case, but clearly was unable to transmit the message to the
embassy, so the programme was closed and NPA left in 2006. NPA has pointed out that,
before closing down its operations, it encouraged staff to create a national mine action
NGO, highlighting that it would hand over its demining equipment, but that this never
materialised, since there was little interest in doing so.
Handicap International (HI)

HI (France) began working in Mozambique as an agency assisting people with
disabilities, ie amputee mine victims. HI compiled a considerable database on the
location of suspected minefields and was very engaged in mine risk education. In 1998,
it started demining in Inhambane in the south, one of the most densely mined provinces
in the country.17 After NPA left, IND asked HI to expand and cover Manica and Sofala
provinces.
17

Inhambane contained half the SHAs identified in the Baseline Assessment
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Compared to the other INGOs, HI is relatively small and does not have a strong
fundraising capacity. Until recently, its main funds came from the Canadian government
and the Canadian Auto Workers union, with some support from HI’s head office in Lyon.
However, as IND began to gain access to more discretionary funding, it was able to
increase its allocations to HI. Unlike the other international operators, all of HI’s staff,
including the field director, are Mozambican, making it a national operator in all but
name.
Given its capacity constraints, HI concentrated on “proximity demining” of small sites
under 15,000 m2. After clearing its priority sites, the organisation decided to follow a
district by district approach to the remaining small sites and mark all those over
15,000m2, before closing at the end of 2006. However, IND asked it to stay and clear all
sites in Inhambane, Manica and Sofala. Therefore, HI decided to conduct a
“comprehensive survey” of all communities in the three provinces. It is now working
only in Inhambane and Sofala provinces as, in the meantime, HALO has taken over
Manica.
APOPO

This Belgian-Tanzanian organisation began work in Mozambique in 2004, initially testing
its rat-based survey and clearance approach in Manica with NPA. It then moved to
Inhambane to continue testing with HI. In 2007-08, IND asked APOPO to start clearance
on its own in Gaza province.
Others

The German NGO MgM was present between 2000 and 2003, and the Mozambican
army (FADM) has also worked somewhat sporadically on demining.
The US State Department funded a RONCO Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF) of
Mozambican deminers that, when not on assignments overseas, operated in the centre
and south.
INGOs and IND

The post-war effort made by ONUMOZ stressed clearance, not the creation and
strengthening of a national mine action centre and authority. Consequently, the
conflict-ridden ONUMOZ/OCHA transition effectively resulted in the country being
divided into three independent operator areas. Because demining resources were tied
to these areas, nationwide priorities could not be addressed.
9

The three regions operated separately, with different:
•
•
•
•
•

resources
work methods
ways of relating to communities and local authorities
criteria for defining priorities
fundraising abilities

In the face of three strong independent operators, IND faced an uphill task to assert its
coordination-direction mandate. The INGOs carried out costly surveys in their
respective areas, sometimes with little reference to IND, using different data collection
methods and coverage, different criteria for categorising suspected hazards and
different definitions of “completion”.
Transition and ownership were therefore rather blurred. Much of what went wrong
could have been avoided, had more attention been given to preparing the institutional
foundations during ONUMOZ and the respective capacity-building requirements.
COMMERCIAL OPERATORS

Initially, international companies were used to verify and clear roads, but after
ONUMOZ, there was a quieter period until reconstruction, and then development
projects, started to pick up.
Early in the decade, IND encouraged the creation of small Mozambican companies. This
is relatively easy to do, requiring only articles of association and the company’s standard
operating procedures (SOPs) (invariably a copy of the IND SOPs). These firms are usually
run by former IND employees and deminers.
According to IND records, there are currently 33 licensed entities:
•
•
•
•

three INGOs
eight national NGOs
20 private mine action
two private quality assurance companies

National NGOs and private companies have no permanent capacity, however. They
recruit deminers and mobilise equipment only when they obtain a contract. IND
inspection of their capacities is limited and when they work for investment companies
or development projects they do not always send records of the work completed to IND
(See some figures in Annex 8).
10

THE CRISIS YEARS: 2004 TO 2006-07

Towards the middle of the decade, the mine action programme, as well as IND and
UNDP in particular, went through a difficult time. This was due to a number of mutually
reinforcing circumstances.
After the antipersonnel mine ban convention had entered into force in 1999, a
programme known as “Adopt a Minefield” (AAM) was created by United Nations
Association-USA, to engage American civil society in mine action. In 2003 and 2004, a
corruption scandal erupted over Adopt a Minefield18 funds, involving the head of the
NPA demining programme, the Deputy Director of IND and a UNDP official, all of whom
were dismissed. This was followed by press reports of abuse of funds by the incumbent
IND director and his predecessor.
Operators announced plans for closure. MgM left in 2003, ADP collapsed in 2005 and
NPA left in 2006. HI made plans to leave at the end of 2006, once all the small sites
remaining in Inhambane were cleared. HALO prepared to leave in mid-2007 after
completing its Mine Impact Free District programme in the centre-north provinces. They
confirmed the widespread sense that the mine problem was not as bad as had been
thought, or else it had already been largely resolved.
The UNDP capacity-building project in IND ended in 2005, with only a chief technical
advisor post remaining. Because of this, IND lost a contingent of its best trained local
staff, who had been on the UNDP project payroll; others were not paid for months while
awaiting admission to the civil service.
After using the findings of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) for the basis of its 20022006 plan, IND started receiving operator reports of excessively contaminated areas and
many unrecorded sites, to such an extent that the database unit had difficulty keeping
track of the information. IND was unable to judge the real level of contamination, nor
how long clearance might take, and UNDP was unable to help much, as it struggled to
cope with the fall-out from the corruption scandal and the ADP debacle.19
All these factors contributed to falling donor support for mine action – from almost USD
23 million in 2002 to USD 17 million, 7.5 million and 4 million in 2005, 2006 and 2007
respectively.20
One of the main concerns of the 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine
18

After the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention entered into force in 1999, Adopt a minefield (AAM) was created by
United Nations Association-USA to engage American civil society in mine action. To date, AAM has raised over USD 25
million for mine action, cleared over 1,000 minefields, and assisted thousands of survivors.
http://www.landmines.org/Page.aspx?pid=374
19
A senior UNDP official has described this period as “UNDP’s dark history”
20
Mozambique’s Article 5 Extension Request, 30 April 2008
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Action Programme in Mozambique21 was the serious problems that arose due to
ignorance of the mine action challenges Mozambique faced. Its recommendations
included joint efforts by IND and operators to:
a) achieve a common definition of “mine impact free” and “mine free”
b) decide on approaches for a complete resurvey
c) discuss how to ensure accurate and up to date information in IMSMA

THE SURVEYS

Annex 1 lists the various actual and proposed surveys in Mozambique.
One of the biggest problems in the history of IND and of mine action in Mozambique
has been the absence of a clear picture of the scale and nature of contamination in the
country. It also is somewhat telling of IND’s fragility that only the final survey conducted
in 2007 was done at the behest of IND. All the others were external initiatives with no
IND involvement.
HALO TRUST SURVEY 1993

The first four-month rough survey contracted by ONUMOZ considerably
underestimated the problem but provided a useful starting point for the three larger
operators.
LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY (LIS) 1999-2001

In 1998, Canada offered to fund a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) as part of a series of
such surveys being launched in mine-affected countries. When consulted in 1998, HI,
NPA and ADP thought a survey was probably a good idea to help prioritisation22, but
HALO felt it was not necessary.
The survey was carried out with little IND involvement, meaning there was no provision
for a capacity-building input for the new institute.
The survey report was only available in 2001, shortly after the UNDP started working
21

IND, UNDP and GICHD, A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique, 2005,
available through the GICHD’s Links and Information for Mine Action database: http://www.gichd.org/linksinformation-database.
22
Even though the first two indicated that as a matter of urgency, and as the proposed LIS would probably take time,
they were intending to do their own surveys to meet their data needs in their areas.
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with IND and the results were not what stakeholders had expected. It was a sample
survey and not the expected comprehensive census survey. It focused on affected
communities rather than minefields, resulting in a gross overestimation of mined areas,
and it seriously underestimated the number of minefields.
Despite these flaws, the LIS became the basis for IND’s first multi-year plan 2002-2006,
with unfortunate consequences. IND stated that it only recognised the LIS failings
around 2004 when it started to put more emphasis on technical surveys23 to reduce the
exaggerated areas, despite the fact that the operators on the ground had been critical
from the start.
HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 2005-07

After expanding to Manica and Sofala provinces, HI decided to conduct a
“comprehensive survey” of the three central provinces, which took place between 2005
and 2007. HI worked in every village and community to confirm existing mine/UXO sites
and to identify new ones and their size. It identified nine million km2 of 651 previously
unknown SHAs, plus roads, although it was expected that the m2 area would be
somewhat smaller after a tighter technical survey. This was carried out when the HI
survey findings were included in the baseline assessment.
NPA TASK IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Prior to closing down in 2005-2006, NPA conducted a task impact assessment of the
minefields it had cleared in its provinces between 1993 and 2005. It measured the
impact and resurveyed the 521 SHAs in the provinces recorded by the LIS, although it
was not a comprehensive survey of every community. After receiving additional funding
from Norway, NPA extended the assessment to cover the southern provinces of Gaza
and Maputo, despite having never worked there in the past.
NPA’s fieldwork targeted “affected communities” rather than suspected minefields per
se.24 The type of data gathered focused on beneficiary incomes and assistance after
clearance. NPA gave IND detailed reports on each site, classifying them as high,
medium, low and negligible impact. NPA would consider the province to be “mine
impact free” if all sites in high, medium and low categories were cleared.
HALO TRUST MINE IMPACT FREE DISTRICT SURVEY

After concluding its clearance work in the centre-north provinces, the HALO Trust
23

These were not technical surveys as defined by IMAS; rather, they were non-intrusive surveys designed to
determine the polygon to be cleared.
24
For example, it only considered four out of 160 power line pylons in Maputo to be hazardous because they were
the only ones with communities nearby, yet virtually all were mined and are now being cleared.
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carried out a Mine Impact Free District (MIFD) survey to confirm that all known mines
had been removed. It took place from October 2004 to June 2007 and involved
interviews with 6,395 communities. In each location, the verification process
culminated in the senior local government official signing off on the appropriate
paperwork. An additional 74 new SHAs were identified and cleared, with 176 mines
found and destroyed. At the end of the exercise, HALO reported that it was satisfied it
had made “every reasonable effort to identify all known mined areas and had cleared all
known mined areas”.25
IND did not accompany HALO’s work on the ground as its QA presence in the north was
minimal at the time. Despite this however, NDI came under pressure to accept the
results without verification. Although these results were cited in the Article 5 extension
request, IND proceeded with a verification process, with a view to districts being
officially declared “mine free” in accordance with IND procedures. During this process it
identified a further 43 suspected mined sites and 34 UXO/EOD spot tasks. At the time
of writing, these were being demined by commercial operators with government funds.
Other reports of sites requiring clearance turned out to be due to an incomplete
handover process. IND has now drafted a set of official handover procedures 26 and
these have been distributed to provincial and district authorities.
THE HALO BASELINE ASSESSMENT

HALO Trust did not leave the country as planned after completing the MIFD survey. At
IND’s request, it conducted a baseline assessment of the remaining six provinces, based
on existing records: LIS, pre and post LIS reports in the IMSMA database and the HI and
NPA surveys.27
The baseline assessment cancelled 71 per cent of the recorded SHAs and confirmed
487. When the results were used as the basis of the National Mine Action Plan 20082010, IND included additional SHAs, increasing the number from 487 to 541, and the
area to 12.1 million m2. The report and plan also included other sites that were known
to exist but had not been surveyed or quantified:
•
•
•
•

Cahora Bassa dam
Chicamba dam
the border with Zimbabwe
one power line in Maputo and two in Sofala

25

The Mine Impact Free Survey of Northern Mozambique Final Report. The HALO Trust. November 2007.
Now included as Chapter 5 of its revised SOPs “Procedimentos de Controle e Garantia de Qualidade para
Operações de Desminagem em Moçambique”.
27
NPA (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Gaza, Maputo) HI (Manica, Sofala and Inhambane). So Manica/ Sofala had already been
surveyed twice prior to the Baseline Assessment.
26
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•

two railways and 33 roads

The baseline assessment was based on existing records ie, it was not a new
comprehensive survey of each community, as HALO felt that all SHAs were known.
However, after HALO began demining in Maputo, it found 43 new sites, with an area of
500,000 m2, in addition to the 50 recorded sites. These original 50 SHAs had been
recorded as having an area of 602,248 m2, but in fact 29 were larger than originally
surveyed, adding 608,917 m2, meaning the total predicted area more than doubled.28
ON THE SURVEYS – TRANSITION FROM SCATTERED EVIDENCE TO HARD
DATA

Eight years passed between the rough survey carried out under ONUMOZ in 1993 and
the LIS report in 2001. A further six years passed until, for the first time, the MIFD and
the baseline assessment gave a much clearer picture of the landmine situation and
enabled IND to produce a realistic and viable plan. Prior to the baseline assessment,
there had been little IND involvement in or ownership of the various surveys. IND did
not commission them nor did it have a say in the methods and criteria used. They were
outside initiatives and, in the case of the post-LIS surveys, they were done to meet the
purposes of those who conducted them (ie exit strategies). No IND involvement also
meant no IND capacity development. These problems dated back to the LIS, as
recognised in Mozambique’s 2008 Article 5 extension request:
“…the limitations or flaws associated with the LIS …created considerable additional
workload in having to revisit most sites and conduct additional stages of survey to
better clarify the reality on the ground. The difficulty in determining an accurate end
state may have contributed to some donor fatigue which in turn resulted in a slowdown
of efforts to implement Article 5.”
The LIS took place at a time when IND was still being set up and – instead of being a
capacity-building instrument – it became just the opposite.
IND’s credibility was undermined when it used the LIS data, which operators considered
to be of little practical use, as the basis for its 2002-2006 plan. Instead of being a means
of coordinating and controlling the operators, the plan made them even more
independent. “The provincial and local authorities and the main humanitarian mine
action (HMA) operators do not necessarily believe in or want to use the LIS data to
prioritise their work. This has led to a situation where IND is largely left out of the
discussion (on areas to be demined); the main actors in this discussion are the operator
and the provincial level authority”.29
28
29

The information on the additional area is inconsistent – see Annex 8
Evaluation of Global Landmine Process. Scanteam
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The LIS operation was run from separate premises. IND was not involved in the
planning, implementation or analysis, so a vital capacity-building opportunity was lost.
However, it was a complicated time. Initial discussions on the LIS started under the CND,
fieldwork took place in 2000 when the UNDP project was starting, with also an
emergency flood project ongoing. IND’s ability to intervene in the LIS may have been
limited, but it should have been better informed. It is difficult to understand why:
a) the UNDP technical advisors participated in drafting the LIS-based plan
b) they did not recommend or push for some kind of resurvey
IND has since stated that it only realised the extent of the LIS problems around 2004,
which speaks volumes about IND-operator communications, and IND’s awareness of the
reality on the ground. There was no national uniformity (each operator with its own
system and methodology) in how new areas were identified, recorded and prioritised,
and with no clear picture of the situation and what was required to complete the
demining programme, donor assistance was bound to falter.30
UN GENDER GUIDELINES

The UN gender guidelines have been widely applied in Mozambique, mainly due to the
government’s strong position on the subject in a country where equality between men
and women is laid down in the Constitution. This is important given that the gender
content of many mine action activities is as much dependent on the composition and
attitude of community structures and government entities as it is on the role of IND or
operators. Surveys and prioritisation involve consultations with local communities
where women are invariably present and free to voice their opinions. Mine risk
education (MRE) takes place in schools, where at primary level, the number of boys and
girls is roughly equal.
Consultation exercises such as the validation of mine free districts involve district and
locality Consultative Councils that always have at least one female member to express
the views and defend the interests of women. In community consultations, rural women
are always ready to voice their concerns. As they tend to be heavily involved in farming,
the weight of agricultural production in impact assessments necessarily reflects their
interests.
In regard to demining entities, HALO has a section made up only of women, and HI has
female deminers. The country manager of HALO, and the head of one of the most active
30

Due to IND’s difficulty in maintaining accurate records in its IMSMA database, its adherence to LIS findings as the
benchmark and its minimal involvement in operational government planning processes at the regional and provincial
levels. .
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commercial companies are women, as are three of IND’s six executive managers – the
heads of the legal, international and human resource departments. After taking a
Madison University course that included gender issues, the head of the legal
department is now responsible for promoting gender awareness in mine action in
Mozambique.
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
EVOLVING ROLES OF UN AGENCIES AND OTHERS
OCHA

Mozambique was one of the first post-war countries to have a demining programme,
and was therefore something of a learning experience for UN agencies. During the
1992-94 peace process, the main OCHA concerns were resettlement, maintaining peace,
demobilising the two armies and elections. Demining focused on road clearance in a
highly politicised context, where time was of the essence, but joint decision-making by
former warring parties was slow. The situation was further complicated by UN
bureaucracy and UN-donor conflicts over demining contracts, and the future national
mine action entity.
Mine action was equated with clearance, and clearance with operational needs and
commercial solutions. HMA was never a priority in Mozambique. The development of
indigenous capacity focused on training and fielding demining teams. As no agreement
was reached on assistance to a mine action centre by the end of the ONUMOZ mandate,
there were no preparations for what might come after, (eg institutional set-up,
responsibilities, resources, etc.)
“The inability of the donors to reach consensus meant that one of the poorest war-torn
countries in the world was not given the help it needed to have a voice in the way in
which the problem of mines was addressed. The absence of a central coordination
mechanism meant that it was up to the mine action agencies and the donors to
determine where and how resources would be allocated and used”. 31
UNDP

The first instance of direct UNDP project support was the ADP, which ran for 11 years in
two phases:
•
•

1994-2000 (operational activities)
2000-2005 (continued operational activities, and a failed attempt to turn ADP
into a national demining organisation)

The CND saw a few capacity-building initiatives, all of which failed, including a UNDP
project between 1996 and 1998. In May 1999, a UNDP mission looked into transforming
31

The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities – Mozambique Study Report. Robert Eaton, Chris Horwood,
Norah Niland. OCHA Publications.
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CND into an institute that would receive capacity-building support. It seems that the
UN-donor relationship remained fragile and donors were unwilling to provide the
necessary funding.32 However, when the government went ahead and created the IND
in June 1999 and, in particular, when it appointed a new director, donor interest was
rekindled.
The project started in March 2000 with a preparatory assistance phase funded by the
government of Denmark. The project document “Capacity Building for the National
Demining Institute” was signed in August 2000. Initially planned for three years, with a
budget of USD 3.7 million, the project eventually ran from 2001-2005 at a cost of USD 7
million. The project also served to channel bilateral donor funds for survey and
clearance. At the beginning of the project, a small parallel emergency UNDP project
called “Flood Related Mine Action” also ran from October 2000 to December 2001.
Although the capacity-building project ended in 2005, there was some continuity in the
form of a UNDP-funded chief technical advisor post. To date, it has been occupied by
three people, usually with a gap of several months between the departure of one and
the arrival of another33. Since 2008, IND capacity development has been supported
under a new project, “Weapons Risk Mitigation and Mainstreaming Mine Action, Small
Arms and Light Weapons Controls 2008-2011”.
The bulk of the funds for the mine action component (USD 950,000) were designated
for clearance, and USD 320,000 were earmarked to build capacity and high level
technical support. Some small amounts were designated for resource mobilisation and
mainstreaming mine action into government plans. However, while carrying out this
study, the researchers found that although the project document had been signed by
the government, and senior IND managers were aware of clearance assistance coming
through UNDP, they knew nothing about the project and had never seen the project
document.
UNICEF

UNICEF provided the MRE technical advisor under the UNDP capacity-building project
and took the lead in working with the government and NGOs. Together with the
Mozambique Red Cross in particular, UNICEF was active until 2003. In 2005, a review of
UNICEF’s activities indicated that there was no longer a serious need for MRE. However,
it continues to be included in the IND 2008-2014 plan.

32
33

Terminal Report for MOZ/00/004 Flood Related Mine Action December 2001
The last CTA left in December 2010 and as of mid-June 2011 his replacement still had not arrived.
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DONORS

Annex 2 shows the evolution of mine action funding in Mozambique over the years.
Since 2002, mine action in the country has been supported by Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the
USA.
Because the government can contribute only limited financial help to mine action,
donor assistance has been vital. However, this often very naturally gives donors the final
say in how a programme evolves.
In the start-up phase, the uncompromising approach of many donors contributed to the
delay of commercial contracts and led to a mine action centre proposal being shelved,
and replaced with a weaker National Demining Commission (CND) instead. A reason
why ADP was never able to shift from a UNDP project to national NGO status is that it
was not possible to mobilise donor support for the idea. However, simultaneous donor
funding through humanitarian operators such as NPA and HALO enabled these NGOs to
fill the vacuum on the ground and determine the areas that would be covered by whom.
Donor funds are provided in a number of ways:
•
•
•
•
•

earmarked support for certain operators
contributions to UNDP projects
untied or tied funds channelled through UNDP projects
funds via an INGO’s own headquarters
direct fundraising by the operators themselves

Most of these channels have meant that IND has had little control over where the funds
went or how they were used, severely curtailing its ownership of the programme.
However, after the cash-strapped crisis years, funding improved, mainly due to the
commitment of Norway, and UNDP efforts to mobilise funds from a number of donors.
Under the current project, both UNDP and IND jointly review the performance of
clearance operations and analyse needs to agree on resource allocation.
In October 2007, Norway and Mozambique organised a round table to assist strategic
planning and preparation of the Article 5 extension request. The two countries later
signed a memorandum of understanding on annual assistance until Article 5 obligations
had been met. It also covers cooperation on resource mobilisation, short term technical
expertise and IND’s coordination of national and international actors.
On the whole, and despite being under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IND has not been
very proactive in mobilising funds or communicating with donors. The main point of
20

contact is the Mine Action Partners Meeting (heads of mission) co-chaired by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the UNDP resident Representative.34
At the time of writing, HALO is the strongest demining force in the country, and has
considerable fundraising capacity. Its goals do not necessarily match IND’s plans.
GOVERNMENT

Government funding usually comprises IND running costs and customs exemptions. IND
has never included in its reports the cost of military demining operations or the
proportion of infrastructure rehabilitation costs reserved for mine clearance.
However, the government’s contribution has risen in recent years and has included
funds for clearance. In 2009, its contribution was double that of the previous year and it
was the largest single contributor (USD three millions out of a total of USD nine
millions).35

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN MINE ACTION: IND AND ADP
IND

The final report on the emergency flood mine action36 project is interesting because, by
the time it started, the main flood relief effort was over and it appears to have turned to
capacity development. The report describes the challenges faced by the new IND as “a
serious state of affairs” and “a very unstable platform to transform into a solid
foundation”. There was little concept of a work plan or financial planning. It also noted
that IND was under great pressure and being forced to take on too many
responsibilities, for which it was unprepared, instead of concentrating on the basics.
The intended end-of-project situation of the UNDP capacity-building project was:
•
•
•
•
•
•

competent local technical, administrative and policy formulation mechanisms and
capacity
a mine action plan
indigenous mine action capability
a mine action strategy with a functioning database
a victim assistance policy and stronger support for victims
more efficient and effective mine action operations

34

There are also quarterly stakeholder meetings with operators, UNDP and donor representatives
IND Annual Report 2009
36
Terminal Report for MOZ/00/004 Flood Related Mine Action Annex 3 “Capacity Building and Support Programmes,
Bilateral and UNDP support, overview and current status”. undated
35
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By the end of the project, many of the stated objectives had been accomplished, in
particular:
a) The putting in place of the essential elements of a mine action centre:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

procedures
plans
reporting formats/procedures
safety and technical guidelines
accreditation criteria and procedures
quality assurance management system
national standard operating procedures
administration
finance and logistics systems and procedures

b) The training of staff to assume responsibility for all of the above, and to develop
staff through:
o on the job training
o some in-house courses and overseas management courses
The biggest challenges were shifting staff from one department to another, language
barriers,37 (some technical advisors didn’t speak Portuguese and staff didn’t speak
English; essential for the international aspects of mine action), as well as the dual
pressure of service performance demands and emerging responsibilities while still
learning.
With mine action generally in its infancy, there was also the problem of change
management in certain fields. The persistent management challenges were overlycentralised management, poor internal coordination, discipline and accountability for
outputs and deadlines and performance problems, issues that were also raised in the
2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique.
However, the biggest threat to sustainability was the build-up of IND capacity based on
the (unplanned) recruitment of extra professional staff on UNDP contracts, that
eventually also forced topping up for existing staff. Under the initial budget “project
personnel” (predominantly technical advisors and their travel) was USD 1.9 million,
about half the budget. By 2005, this had risen to USD 4.3 million and two-thirds of the
budget. In 2001 there were 13 nationals on the UNDP payroll, in 2004 there were 53.38

37

Some TA had problems with Portuguese and staff didn’t speak English, which was also essential for the
international aspects of MA
38
UNDP Capacity Building Project Annual Reports
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When the project and UNDP contracts ended in 2005, most of the best qualified staff
left, including people who benefited most from the training but who found better jobs
because of it. The situation was aggravated when some of those who wanted to stay
could not because IND’s limited personnel budget could not accommodate them all.39
Even those who managed to stay had to wait six months until they were formally
admitted to the civil service and could be paid.
However, it is widely recognised that IND competence has grown in recent years. This is
partly because the contamination problem was reduced to six provinces. Some staff
members were transferred out of IND as the workload fell, but the most able and
experienced were retained, some completing university degree courses part time. Some
areas have been strengthened to cope with the demands of the new situation eg,
quality assurance.
Managers who remember IND’s early years recall that, given the pressures of the
moment, the technical advisors tended to take charge as much as they supported local
personnel in doing the tasks and make the decisions, and some were not very
competent. Nevertheless, they acknowledge it as learning experience.
Current IND staff feel that they gained little from the single chief technical advisor
system, as none of the technical advisors had any specialist mine action knowledge. In
particular, they point out that the two most important documents for the future of IND
– the lengthy Article 5 submission and the 2008-2012 plan – were prepared by IND staff
(with some input from Survey Action Center (SAC) and the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)), at a time when there was no chief technical
advisor present.
The job description for the new chief technical advisor post is very broad. It covers an
enormous range of activities, including:
•
•
•
•

most of the core functional capacities
technical and operational advice
organisational and individual capacity development
keeping UNDP informed of the mine action situation and donor relations

With a view to the future, it also includes advising on sustainable mine action capacity
and capacity development plans for IND, the military, police and operators on how to
handle residual issues.

39

One senior IND staff member commented that during the crisis years the salary of the CTA was equivalent to half
IND’s budget. The salary issue still upsets senior managers when they compare their government salaries with those
of colleagues in other countries working on UN-funded MA projects.
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Current staff have said the main function of the chief technical advisor was to be the
eyes and ears of UNDP and donors within IND, and so they continue to support the post
to avoid losing donor funding 40
One important point is that if IND does not feel it needs capacity-building assistance and
is not engaged in planning, then no matter how good the chief technical advisor is, he or
she will not be able to achieve much.
ADP

Under the UNDP project, the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) received a great
deal of capacity-building support. This came mostly through teams of military technical
advisors on six-month secondments, and training in the skills required for a typical mine
action programme:
•
•
•
•

clearance
quality assurance
machinery maintenance
dog handling

In the process, through its Moamba training centre, ADP became a focal point for
capacity development. This was lost to Mozambique when ADP collapsed, although its
expertise is still benefiting mine action programmes in other countries through
recruitment for RONCO and demining firms.

40

UNDP comments that the CTA is provided at the request of IND and it approves the TOR for the post.
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION
PROGRAMME – RECONFIGURATION PHASE

The 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in
Mozambique concluded that the:
•
•
•

humanitarian impact of mines had been greatly reduced
number of victims had fallen substantially
growing challenge was supporting development priorities

It also concluded that Mozambique would not be clear of mines in the foreseeable
future, with the biggest challenge being IND’s inability to provide a clear picture of
contamination. The study highlighted the vague mine free/mine impact free concept,
the need for a link between mine action and development, and problems with the
institutional set-up.
However, much has changed since then. The initial catalyst was the 2007 Mine Impact
Free District (MIFD) report that reduced the country’s suspected hazardous area by half.
Formal verification and handover have proceeded in these and other provinces, where
the district-by-district approach has greatly simplified planning, monitoring and
verification. By 2010, 50 of Mozambique’s 128 districts had been declared mine free,
with the prospect of a further 42 in 2011.
The MIFD and the baseline assessment provided sufficient information for
Mozambique’s detailed request for an Article 5 extension. In addition, after two
previous plans with revisions41 based on shaky data, they enabled IND to prepare a
definitive evidence-based national mine action plan for 2008 to 2014, to achieve
compliance, with a year-by-year clearance budget. Although a major step forward, the
“evidence” was in fact far from accurate. On the one hand, there were the abovementioned data problems in Maputo province. On the other hand a number of known
major problems such as the large minefields around the Cahora Bassa dam and along
the Zimbabwe border had not been quantified when the plan was drafted, although
their estimated clearance cost was included in the budget and there were a number of
known but unvisited sites. Consequently, while the 2008-2014 plan could only cite 541
known mined areas with 12.1 million m2, a preliminary IND report on the three years
2008-2010 shows that the figures had risen to 822 tasks and 23.4 million m2. Of these,
486 tasks/9.2 million m2 were cleared during that period – equivalent to 92 per cent
and 105 per cent of the respective quantified targets in the Five-Year Plan.

41

2007-2009, 2008-2012
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The geographical division of the country by operator remains, with HALO Trust in
Maputo, Manica and Tete, Handicap International in Inhambane and Sofala, and APOPO
in Gaza, although IND has to some extent since had a say in the distribution.
However, there has since been a recovery in donor funding, mostly due to the clearer
picture, the new Article 5 compliance target, the Norwegian commitment, and
mobilisation by UNDP and HALO. There was also a substantial rise in government
funding; to USD 3 million in 2009, when it was the largest single contributor to the
programme. Mine action has been included as a cross-cutting issue in the government’s
five-year plan, approved at the first sitting of the current legislature.
Planning methods have been changed to accommodate the district-by-district approach.
It has been clearly established that the aim is not mine impact free but mine free42, and
there is a strong emphasis on land release to increase efficiency. Official procedures for
the declaration of district mine free status and the role of local authorities have been
established and distributed to operators and government entities. Revised MMAS and
standard operating procedures have been prepared.
In line with the government’s decentralisation policy, provincial governments will play a
key role in mine action:
•
•
•
•

setting priorities
monitoring mine action
provision of mine risk education (MRE)
validation of mine free status with IND

Provincial Demining Commissions have been created, with members from development
and security wings of government to take on some of these responsibilities.43 IND is
being restructured to meet the new challenges and has reduced staff, from 68
employees in 2006 to around 40 in 2010,and aiming toward a target of 20 by 2014.

42

Defined as “All districts where there are no mined areas or known suspected areas”
Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance, Provincial Police Command and the army with optional
representation by other sectors in line with the mine-related issues in each province e.g. tourism in Inhambane and
mineral resources in Tete

43
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

DECISION-MAKING AND THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION TO
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

Responsibility for decision-making and the transition process are interconnected. The
mine action programme in Mozambique has never been through a consistent, coherent
process that culminated in a single formal transition decision point, or a single plan on
how such a point would be reached. There have been several transition variants arising
from a number of muddled processes. The main transition features in Mozambique are:
•

Throughout the various mine action processes, ownership was always conditional on
control over money and where it went. Government contribution was minimal until
recently, meaning that donors and the operators who prepared project proposals
for funding had the greatest decision-making power on how much was spent and
where.

•

Transition from large commercial operators to a “national” mine action capability in
the form of ADP (a UNDP project) was the product of an improvised process during a
confused ONUMOZ era that was never clearly thought through. It was an
“indigenous” entity in composition but not in institutional form. Failure to resolve
this conundrum is one of the tragedies of mine action in Mozambique.

•

There was no transition process from ONUMOZ to CND per se, just a gap between
one starting and one ending. Post-ONUMOZ donor pressure pushed the government
into producing a weak CND that combined both authority and MAC functions with
inappropriate leadership to address complex issues and cultivate sound donor
relations. Its position under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation diluted
the internal governmental attention the sector needed. A more suitable and
workable plan, with the relevant capacity-building support, should have been put in
place before or just after ONUMOZ closed.

•

Transition to IND, UNDP and potential ownership – IND had the benefit of a new
director and a UNDP capacity-building project that managed to establish more solid
foundations, although many of the people it trained left. However, the biggest
problem was that the independent operators had become entrenched in their three
regions and IND did not have sufficient authority over them and, therefore, over the
national mine action programme. Nevertheless, three years after the project ended,
with the MIFD and baseline assessment data and a little outside help, IND staff were
able to prepare an Article 5 extension request and the national mine action plan for
2008 to 2014.
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•

It is difficult to unravel the effects of the official end of the UNDP project in 2005
and other events that contributed to the crisis years. Nevertheless, the decision to
hire qualified people on contract, in order to achieve “end of project” objectives was
opportunistic, short-sighted and indeed dishonest, as it was obvious that the best
would not stay. Also, the project technical advisors failed to steer IND in the
direction of a plausible alternative to the LIS and UNDP’s collaboration in the LISbased first IND plan. The collapse of donor support also had a UNDP footprint: its
involvement in the Adopt a Minefield scandal and the disintegration of ADP
undermined its hitherto significant role in mobilising funding for mine action.

•

The departure of a number of international operators could have been turned to
IND’s advantage, providing the ideal opportunity for a transition to an ADP-based
national operational capability44 and national ownership. Instead ADP was allowed
to collapse. Donor reluctance was only part of the problem. The root cause was that
it was conceived as a project, not a national demining organisation receiving outside
support (possibly in project form). Therefore, the emphasis was on demining
operations, not transition. What came afterwards was an improvised panic
response. Consequently, some responsibility for the outcome of ADP’s 11 years as a
UNDP project must lie with UNDP. Another major part, however, lies with the
government. If it was truly interested in having a strong, national mine action
capability, the government could have made it happen. It did not.

•

The turning point in IND’s assertion of ownership came with the MIFD and baseline
assessment. The IND personnel who prepared the Article 5 extension request were
initially recruited under the UNDP capacity-building project. They received training
through other means, such as practical experience, rotation through different
departments, short courses and interacting with colleagues from other mine action
programmes, and some also obtained university degrees. Although UNDP’s
involvement in capacity development was the heaviest and most costly, a number of
smaller agencies have for many years provided consistent assistance focused on
specific areas as and when needed. For example, SAC and the GICHD have made a
vital and possibly more lasting contribution than the isolated CTAs.

One persistently weak point with ownership implications is IND’s difficulty in addressing
what comes after information is gathered. It is presented in annual reports as facts and
descriptions, with little or no analysis; there are no in-depth studies of a key issue or
problem. This may be due to a lack of time, although two senior staff members
specifically mentioned analytical capacity/skills as being a challenge and constraint.

44

According to the former ADP director as early as 2003 there were informal approaches by departing operators who
hoped that ADP would take over from them
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Areas that could warrant more in-depth attention include demining costs45 and operator
productivity.

In the final transitional push to a mine free Mozambique, IND is undoubtedly
performing better and is gaining more discretionary access to resources. However, the
operator challenge persists. There is a small operator (APOPO), a somewhat larger and
stronger one (HI) and a very large and powerful one (HALO Trust) with strong
fundraising capacity and, therefore, the freedom to apply those funds where and how it
sees fit. This places certain constraints on IND ownership as it seeks to pursue its 2014
target in the way it sees fit. It has also been pointed out however, that, if IND had a
stronger set of national rules and regulations in place, which all operators would have to
adhere to, its leadership role would be considerably strengthened.
ISSUES FACING MORE MATURE MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES

Every country has different contamination problems, ways of addressing them and
capacity to do so. In Mozambique, one of the targets of the 2008-2014 plan is to
prepare for residual mine and UXO contamination. The main tasks are:
•
•
•

defining and building the capacity of the entity that will deal with these
preparation of an action plan for residual contamination, including funds for
survey and clearance
action on both mine risk education and victim assistance

The various preparatory measures mentioned in section 4 reflect some of the concerns.
An overview of the Mozambican experience raises the following issues:
a) The importance of the database and correctly recording figures so that:
•
•
•

survey and clearance records are correct and up to date
the outstanding tasks for survey or full clearance are known and can be
planned for
there is a notion of the likely kind of residual problems

b) Mine action information should be easily available to development and investment
entities that intend to work in a given area. Any data on subsequent measures
should be recorded correctly, stored in a timely fashion and be available to those
who need it.
45

IND reportedly asked the private operators to get together and come up with a reference price. Needless to say
they came up with the highest figure discussed.
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c) The importance of identifying the likely residual problems and the capabilities
needed to address them in the field, eg survey, clearance, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), quality assurance, mine risk education, handover and information
management. Although there is as yet no clear plan for Mozambique, there are
some positive signs:
•

•
•

provincial/district authorities will now be responsible for confirming new
problems and organising appropriate solutions eg EOD, contacting a
clearance entity
the police will be responsible for EOD, with training underway
the army will be responsible for clearance

d) There are many private operators in Mozambique, and they are in many instances
poorly controlled and with dubious capacity. For this reason, more rigorous licensing
rules and decisions about reducing their number is required, and the demand for
and control over private operators needs to be studied, including quality assurance
and reporting. Under the current set-up, work for private operators is insufficient to
ensure the financial viability of any company. Once Mozambique has fulfilled its
clearance obligations under the Ottawa convention, there will probably be even less
work, although “precautionary surveys” by investors might increase.
The current rough division of responsibility for resources has seen humanitarian
operations (mainly donor-funded) working to clear not only minefields that impact
on communities, but also supporting development projects such as power and
railway lines. HALO’s current clearance of electricity pylons with donor funds is
justified on various grounds:
•
•
•

local communities and/or their resources (eg cattle) are affected
the development brought about by more secure power supplies eventually has an
impact on the well-being of communities
HALO has assumed full responsibility for ensuring that Maputo province achieves
mine free status
Major public development projects (eg roads) have invariably included a budget
item for survey and clearance by commercial operators, although this practice is
declining as more areas are cleared. Investors also hire commercial operators for
their own survey and clearance requirements and will probably continue to do so
whenever they feel there is a need, even in areas that have been declared mine free
by IND.
Much has been said about the inclusion of mine action in the government’s plans,
first as a “cross-cutting” issue and now the need for “mainstreaming”.
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Mainstreaming implies inclusion in sector plans, with financial provision in the
budget. For example, several years ago, MRE was successfully mainstreamed by the
Ministry of Education through teacher training, at little or no extra cost. Surveys and
clearance, however, are a different matter. In keeping with decentralisation, it
seems that a special allocation in the provincial budgets has been considered,
although there has also been reference to provisions in a globalising ministry46 or in
the individual sector ministries most likely to be affected, such as the departments
of public works and agriculture. However, unless this is made mandatory, in a “mine
free” Mozambique, far greater needs are bound to crowd out provision for a
possible but as-of-yet unknown mine action requirement.47 On the other hand, if
the army is to become responsible for residual issues, this would surely have to be
covered by its regular budget.48
e) The institutional set-up and a clear definition of responsibilities; central, provincial
and district. This involves what legal form a future IND/MAC equivalent will take, its
structure and responsibilities, where it will be placed, and the composition and role
of an eventual national authority.
f) As an organisation matures and acquires more experience and capacity short term
technical advisors or consultancy support, it will be far more productive and
effective than a long term UNDP technical advisor position with generic terms of
reference.
g) The end is in sight but there are still many challenges for IND before it is achieved. It
is possible that, over the next two years or so before Article 5 compliance with
APMBC obligations is achieved (which may or may not happen); there could still be
capacity constraints. However, if these are to be identified correctly and addressed,
it must be an IND initiative.

46

A ministry with responsibilities that impact on all or many sector ministries such as the Ministry of Development,
the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Public Administration
47
Although it has been suggested that any identified need could be included in the relevant sector’s budget the
following year.
48
It is highly unlikely that the Vietnamese experience of sector ministry, provincial/district government, donor and
investor funding of army clearance would be an option in Mozambique.
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KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT
Some findings of the 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action
Programme in Mozambique remain relevant to the issue of transition to national
ownership.
•

Once a series of independent mine action programmes are established, it is more
difficult to put in place an effective mechanism for national coordination and
ownership of the process.
A half-hearted attempt to impose coordination on a group of organisations with
established programmes is worse than no attempt at all. It does not solve the
problem and leaves the government facing a credibility gap to overcome once it
advances a better conceived coordination mechanism.
In Mozambique, a weak central body enabled operators to proceed and consolidate
their positions, however their independently growing strength and knowledge made
it difficult for national capacity to develop. However, it is also possible that with a
different institutional set-up and more government commitment to mine action,
IND could have been strengthened.

•

A key element of government ownership is its ability to collect accurate data on
suspected hazardous areas and their impact, and to guarantee the efficient storage
of this information. This means ensuring a match between addressing the need for:
o clear, reliable information on contamination (location)
o an assessment of the impact of this contamination on communities and
development programmes
This requires close coordination between central and local government entities and
operators on the ground. The central mine action entity must have the ability to:
o develop these norms and guidelines
o establish a single set of impact criteria
o ensure that they are being applied and record the information received
promptly and efficiently
If it does not develop this capacity, the operators will lead the process, and in so
doing produce separate information and government control of the situation will
remain weak.
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In Mozambique, the LIS was conducted by an external entity, did not engage with
operators and used impact indicators that were considered irrelevant by all the
actors involved. The operators applied their own systems and criteria.
•

An efficient and effective database system is of crucial importance:
o for planning and treaty compliance purposes
o as a permanent source of accurate information as clearance efforts wind
down
The move to “impact free” status and “residual” contamination must remain at a
high level of importance, even as other government functions decline database
management capacity. This has not been the case in IND although the recent
decision to shift the database from the planning to the operations department is an
important step.

•

When building a post-conflict mine action centre from scratch, the immediate
pressure is to get the job done, particularly as lives are at stake. However, the
option of cutting corners by hiring staff outside the government system and with
remuneration considerably higher than public sector salary levels is self-defeating
and the antithesis of institutional capacity development. It causes conflict with
existing public service staff and those trained leave as soon as the funding runs out.
However, if the departure of this additional manpower coincides with a substantial
reduction in the problems to be tackled (or the challenges are not as great as
initially anticipated), then a short term intensive manpower approach could be
justified. It could then be reduced to a downsized core team of experienced
permanent staff to oversee winding down of the programme and the transition to a
residual mine action capacity. To some extent this is what has happened in
Mozambique but by default, not as part of a strategy. The abrupt and unplanned
transition resulted in serious repercussions for both IND capacity and the mine
action programme.

•

An effective public mine action entity requires:
o technical expertise
o good management skills
o an appropriate organisational structure and system and administrative
procedures
If the institutional capacity development of technical advisors is to be effective,
senior management must recognise the above needs and work to ensure internal
organisational development. Without this commitment, no amount of external
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assistance can build an effective organisation. Then, as the programme matures,
management should improve networking/mobilisation skills within government to
ensure that other public entities play their part.
The absence of a mine action authority, the unusual institutional location of IND
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the fact that the IND director has always
come from an international relations/diplomacy background have probably not
provided the best context for the mine action programme in Mozambique. To a
certain extent, this reflects
a) the origins of IND
b) how mine action was put lower on the government’s policy and development
agenda when the problem turned out to be less acute than initially predicted.
Given the relatively few mine incidents over the last decade this position is
understandable.
As the main effort draws to a close, much more thought is going into the postcompliance organisational set-up than occurred during the establishment of IND.
•

The relationship between an “aid provider” or “fund manager” and the beneficiary is
often not an easy one. Given the current stage of mine action in Mozambique, a
“project/chief technical advisor” structure might be less useful than a number of
short term consultancies focusing on issues of particular relevance to the current
downsizing phase. However, IND regularly requests a chief technical advisor,
seemingly to ensure the continued flow of funds. UNDP says it provides a chief
technical advisor because IND requests one. Often, the incumbent chief technical
advisor finds there is little he can advise on, or the advice is unwelcome.
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1

Surveys in Mozambique – actual and intended
Who
UN

When
1992

Findings
“Back of an envelope” estimate of two million mines in Mozambique

HALO

1993

Rough emergency survey by HALO identified 981 mined areas provided; input for
the first SHAMAN database on SHA

NPA

1998-99

HI

1998-99

CIDC

2000-01

HALO

2004-07

NPA

2005-06

Prior to leaving Mozambique conducted a Task Impact Assessment of all centresouth provinces (Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo)

HI

2006-07

Comprehensive village by village survey of the centre-south mix of provinces
where it was operating - Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane

HALO

2007

IND

2008-

Intending to conduct a ”Level 1 survey” documenting what was already done and
identifying what remained to be done in Tete, Manica and Sofala (planned but
perhaps not carried out)
A survey of the southern province where it was based - Inhambane - gathering
logistical information, socio-economic data aimed at a risk-based and demining
value-added prioritisation (planned but perhaps not carried out)
A flawed Landmine Impact Survey found 123 out of 128 districts contaminated;
1,374 SMAs affecting 1,488,998 people in 791 communities, affected area of
562km2. This was totally different to the real situation.
A Mine Impact Free District exercise in four centre-north provinces (Zambézia.
Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado) identified and cleared 74 new SHAs. It then
declared that there were no known areas left to demine

Baseline assessment carried out of all known centre-south provinces (Tete,
Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo) based on IND database/LIS, HI
and NPA surveys. Visited 1,844 sites, cancelled 1,192, identified 484 mined areas
(later increased to 541), 165 spot UXO sites, 33 mined roads and six battle area
clearance tasks. While demining HALO found another 43 sites and additional
area of 1.5 million square metres
District by district verification of the HALO survey of the four centre-north
provinces identified a further 43 SMAs and 34 UXO sites.
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ANNEX 2

Funding for the mine action programme
Table 1: Funding for the mine action programme 1999-2009 (million USD)
State
Donor
Total
%
State
Donor

1999
0.2
12.0
12.2

2000
0.2
17.0
17.2

2001
0.3
15.1
15.4

2002
5.9
16.9
22.8

2003
1.3
18.1
19.4

2004
7.6
14.4
22.0

2005
2.1
15.0
17.1

2006
1.3
6.2
7.5

2007
1.3
2.7
4.0

2008
1.56
4.3
5.86

2009
3.0
5.9
8.9

Total
24.76
127.6
152.36

2%
98%

1%
99%

2%

26%

7%

35%

12%

17%

33%

27%

34%

16%

Source: Mozambique’s Article 5 extension request; 2008 and 2009 annual reports

The mine action programme in Mozambique is financed mainly by the international
community. The state usually finances the activities of IND and contributes tax exemption for
the goods and equipments used in demining. The Mozambican army’s contribution is never
included. However, in recent years the state budget has also provided funds for demining, and
over the period 2007-2009 it contributed around a third of all funds (Total USD 18.8 of which
USD 5.9 government and USD 12.9 donors).
Table 2: Costs for the extension period presented in the Article 5 extension request (USD)
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Total

Demining

6,689,145

5,662,595

5,945,724

6,140,993

3,538,500

27,976,957

IND

2,021,800

1,853,800

1,309,500

930,200

863,200

6,978,500

TOTAL

8,710,945

7,516,395

7,255,224

7,071,193

4,401,700

34,955,457

Table 3: Projections Mine Action Plan 2008-2014 (USD)
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

3.819.000

6.957.306

8.440.418
913.596
1.000.000

4.931.906

1.752.090

835.540

3.819.000
893.680

125.000
7,082,306
479.344

10,354,014
537.456

4.931.906
617.839

1.752.090
600.834

835.540
600.834

371.530

199.727

223.940

257.433

250.348

250.348

743.060
230.000
6.057.270

399.453
279.617
8.440.447

447.880
313.516
11.876.806

514.866
360.406
6.682.450

500.695
350.487
3.454.454

500.695
350.487
2.537.904

2,658,769
1,884,513
39,049,331

State budget funds
1.563.270 1.800.000
International funds
4.494.000 6.640.447
Total funds
6.057.270 8.440.447
% state
26%
21%
% GOM
74%
79%
Source: National Mine Action Plan 2008-2014

2.000.000
9.876.806
11.876.806
17%
83%

2.500.000
4.182.450
6.682.450
37%
63%

2.500.000
954.454
3.454.454
72%
28%

1.700.000
837.904
2.537.904
67%
33%

12,063,270
26,986,061
39,049,331
31%
69%

Surveys and demining
Cahora Bassa dam
Mp-Komatiport pylons
Survys /dem Zim border
SubTotal demining
Demining QA
Information
management
Coordination
Civic education
Total estimated cost

2013

Total
26,736,260
913,596
1,000,000
125,000
28,774,856
3,729,987
1,553,326
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Of the total USD 39 million needed to implement this plan, it is expected that USD 12 million
will be provided by the government through the state budget and USD 27 million by donors.

Operator
HALO (13%)

Table 4: Funds channelled through UNDP in 2010 in USD
Total
Source
455,010
50,000
DFID
80,000
AusAid
170,000
UNDP Trac 1
155,010
UNDP Trac 3

HI (37%)

1,337,558

50,000
140,000
140,000
200,000
807,558

DFID
AusAid
UNDP Trac 1
Japan
UN Trust Fund

APOPO (23%)

818,977.97

161,423.94
150,000
201,688.02
305, 866,01

DFID
Italy
UN Trust Fund
Japan

MECHEM (3%)

121,754.22

121,754.22

Japan

IND (24%)

868,997.93

273,532.04
79,037.60
30,962.31
124,002.12
82,499.68
210,188.53
68,775.65

Trac 1
DFID
Italy
Japan
Australian Aid
UN Trust Fund
Trac 3

3,602,298.12

340,462
302,500
807,318
1,219,435
751,622
180,962

DFID (9%)
AusAid (8%)
UNDP Trac (22%)
UN Trust Fund (34%)
Japan (21%)
Italy (5%)
3,602,298.12 (100%)

TOTAL (100%)

Source: UN SALW Annual Report 2010 and additional information from UNDP

UN/UNDP contributed the largest amount; 56 per cent. The largest beneficiary was IND itself,
almost one quarter of the funds.
According to the IND annual report; in 2009, mine action received almost USD 9 million (both
funds received through UNDP and also other funds).
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ANNEX 3

Capacity-building assessments
1. Summary of IND capacity-building and support programmes – bilateral and UNDP
supported: overview and current status (2001)
(Attachment to terminal report for MOZ/00/004 “Flood Related Mine Action”)

a) Background
In September 1999, the government of Mozambique established the new National Demining
Institute and, under donor pressure, appointed a new director.

b) General Achievements
•
•

•
•
•
•

Major change in attitude from 1999. CND was had not achieved much result when it was
transformed into IND, leaving a very unstable platform to transform into a solid foundation
IND produced a strategy for the next five years covering mine awareness, location and
clearance of mined areas, training, human resources without much input from the TA, and
an activity plan for 2002
First meeting of the interministerial Technical Council in December 2000, to establish this
forum, and a second meeting in March 2001 to establish priorities
First meeting of the operators working group in August 2000, the second in November
2000. Operators thereafter decided to meet once a year
Quarterly meetings with donors established
CTA and IND developed a document on donor support

c) Current Status
Information and Planning
•

The most important department of IND has a staff of seven (the head of department, a
database supervisor responsible for outputs, a data entry supervisor and four input clerks).
It records all information, distributes and determines mine action priorities. It also produced
a strategy, mission plan, activity plan and the overview of mine action for 2000

•

Database has been restored to working order. Hardware and networking equip was set up
and software installed. Existing data was translated into EVISMA format and new report
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formats distributed to operators. Basic training in IMSMA. A technical advisor from Canada
helped IND by providing invaluable assistance. IND staff could not have performed this task
unassisted as it involved in-depth hardware and computer science knowledge
•

Database personnel worked through all the Level 2 and 3 reports and any inaccurate reports
were referred to operators for rectification. This was a slow but necessary process to get
the database to the required standard. Staff did 35 reports a day

•

Level 1 Survey (LIS) has almost been concluded, and information transferred to the National
Database. It will provide a benchmark of the mine problem and enable this department to
produce a national mine action plan

•

Personnel have good language capability and the necessary qualifications

•

Requests for information are now dealt with within 48 hours. A database can produce mine
maps that indicate suspect areas. Most information requirements are from government or
NGOs involved in development or other commercial operations. Few requests are received
from the three main operators.

What is needed:
-

Decentralisation to regional offices
More training and latest IMSMA
Operator training in new reporting formats
Forums for distribution of information
A mine action plan after completing Level 1 activities
Establishment of a system for tasking, tracking and completion of tasks

Operations:
•
•
•

•

•

Mine action projects have been developed
There are work plans for a flood emergency programme
Tender procedures have been reviewed and the system is very transparent. Selection
criteria had been clearly defined and tender committee established. IND is still
inexperienced but is learning by training, practical experience and lessons learned
Standard operating procedures have been developed for all categories of mine action.
Accreditation Procedures have been developed but new International Standards are still to
be finalised. Quality control procedures will be concluded as soon as international standards
are finalised
Training is given in priority topics where IND is having difficulty to prepare and interpret
proposals:
-

Mine action information requirements
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-

Use of explosive detection dogs
Use of mechanical assisted mine clearance
Calculating productivity
Preparation of a scope of work
Preparation of a request for proposals

What is needed:
Operations personnel have a good demining background but some weaknesses need to be
addressed through training:
-

Problem solving
Technical analyses
Technical interpretation
Technical evaluations
Investigation of accidents
Technical reports
Quality assurance and quality control

Human Resources:
•
•
•

The HR department consists of one head and an assistant responsible for TOR,
advertising, recruitment and determining training requirements
Any new staff recruited are of a high standard
Salaries are a problem; most of the new staff are recruited for temporary projects, so
their capacity will be lost as soon as these support projects end

What is needed:
-

Staff are capable of performing duties but have difficulty in determining training
requirements for staff development. General management and personnel development
training is required

-

Salary issues need to be resolved. This involves consolidating all support programmes,
including the Government of Mozambique (GOM) contribution, and creating one budget
for IND, addressing all outstanding requirements. The GOM must approve the final
budget.

Administration and finance:
•

Comprises the department head, two accountants, one procurement and inventory control
clerk. It is responsible for all administration and finance matters in IND, as well as managing
three secretaries, six drivers and three cleaners. A technical advisor arrived in March 2001
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•

The department was disorganised, and staff did not have clearly defined responsibilities.
There were no administrative working forms or procedures, no accounting principles or
standards and no accounting tools for record purposes
Objectives were established:
o Job descriptions and responsibilities were developed
o information and reporting were clearly defined and given direction
o administrative working procedures and forms were established with a set of
accounting principles

•

On the job training started soon after the administrative and financial systems were in place

•

The technical advisor for the administration and finance has regular sessions with national
counterpart, to develop leadership skills including supervising, planning, controlling and
monitoring

•

What is needed:
•

The system is not flexible for urgent requirements. Coordination needs to be further
improved and instructions channelled through the head of the department

•

There are training needs:
-

General management
Administrative and financial procedures
Budget controls
Budget revisions
Financial reporting procedures
Inventory control
Procurement procedures

International Relations:
•

One person deals with all issues relating to projects: status of funding, visas and work
permits. There is a fine line where the responsibility of the national director stops and
the department’s starts.

What is needed:
-

Improve communications with donors
Keep persons informed of progress
Timely notification of events
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-

Interaction with the other departments

d) General Achievements
•

National Director: has a clear vision of where he wants to go and is committed but needs to
improve coordination and delegation and should be more patient in achieving objectives in
order to maintain quality

•

Deputy Director: has no clear function or responsibility and executes tasks as instructed by
the National Director. Director must delegate to the Deputy a clear line function.

•

Coordination needs improvement

•

Basic training needs have been identified. Formal management training has been arranged
for IND department heads that will take three months.

•

Mandate and responsibilities: IND has an extensive mandate and has acquired more
responsibility than it was originally prepared for. Objectives are reached but results are
sometimes below standard. Pressure from all levels to deliver results has forced IND to
perform above its capacity. This can result in hasty action without proper consideration for
the longer term consequences or outcomes. IND is judged by its performance, which can
impact negatively on confidence levels.

•

Capacity development:
-

For capacity development to succeed in IND, commitment, dedication and enthusiasm
is needed from national counterparts, especially senior management. There is room for
improvement at other levels, and staff need to be motivated.

-

Training will play a major role in improving skills in IND but it is up to nationals to put
effort into their work. They should emphasise training, be involved in resolving
problems, and play an active training role when required. Technical advisors also need
training to keep them abreast of the latest developments and improve their knowledge
and ability to transfer skills.

e) Conclusions
•

IND has improved significantly over the last 12 months, mainly due to the national
director and his staff making an effort to achieve results and improve accessibility and
communication with operators and partners. There is a need to emphasise improving
coordination, tasking and sharing of information
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•

Departments are in an acceptable shape and the needs to improve them further have
been identified. Coordination must be improved within the various departments and
procedures for information flow between departments have been established

•

The IND is taking on too many responsibilities, mainly because of external pressure to
demonstrate it is achieving results. They should instead concentrate on getting the
basics sorted take on further responsibilities only when ready

•

Technical decision-making is improving and problems are being analysed before
decisions are made. A lot of emphasis is placed on this area to maintain continuity in the
decision-making process

•

All TAs were put in place before the end of June 2001 to improve the quality of outputs.
TA functions are to train IND staff to enable them to perform their tasks. Training of TAs
is also recommended to improve their knowledge on current technologies and to enable
them to transfer knowledge

•

IND in general is showing encouraging results and continued support is recommended.
Support programmes should be revised and consolidated to ensure all requirements of
IND are fully covered

2. Review of ten years of assistance to the mine action programme in Mozambique,
October 2005 (1)
The 2005 A Review of Ten Year Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique
referred to a 2001 study by a consultant who made various capacity- building
recommendations. It produced the following table on the status of implementation of the
consultant’s recommendations at that time.
Main recommendation
• Match mandate to capacity

•
•
•

•

Strengthen the institute’s
internal management

•

•

•

Sub recommendation
Focus mandate and priorities to match
resources.
Develop multi-year business plan and
budget to correspond to activities
Build capacities related to priorities as
stated in the work plan
Reorganise and strengthen the
management council into a working senior
management committee
Restructure the office of the deputy
director to take direct responsibility for
operations
Clarify roles and reporting relationships

Progress
Some
Some
Some
No

No
No
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•

•

Address human resource
management challenges

•

Improve operations

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Improve external relations
management

•
•
•
•
•

Ensure smooth working relationships
between TA and counterparts by holding
workshops
Ensure effective transfer of data from CIDC
to IND
Strengthen IND database by conducting
client satisfaction surveys
Outsource QA to contractors
Strengthen regional offices
Decentralise authority to regional offices
Create a regional office for the south in the
headquarters
Create a LAN for internal communications
Provide PCs to all managers
Create IND web site
Use governance bodies provided to create
value for mine action community
Publish regular newsletter for community
needs

No
Yes
No
No
Some
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

3. Review of ten years of assistance to the mine action programme in Mozambique,
October 2005 (2)
The report (written during the crisis years) contained a number of recommendations relevant
to capacity development, performance and the transition to a sustainable solution for
Mozambique’s contamination problem, most of which were not accepted/implemented.
Recommendations: number and summary

1, 2, 3

IND should meet with operators (HALO, NPA, HI, ADP) to discuss their
understanding of “mine impact free” and formulate a common definition; to discuss
alternative approaches to systematic resurvey leading to reduced, defined SHAs and
preliminary classification; to agree upon the information management system to
ensure IMSMA data are correct and up to date

9,10

Inclusion of mine action in government development plans

12,13, 14 GOM should establish an interministerial body to serve as a national authority, a
mine action centre and a board of directors to oversee implementation of its mine
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action policy

15, 20

On capacity development:
•

•

CTA should assess existing capacities for analysing data and providing technical
advisory services to GOM and the public sector and prepare the respective
capacity development plan
To initiate the next stage of capacity development IND Director, with CTA
support, should establish a performance management approach, set
performance management targets, monitor performance and take appropriate
capacity development action

16,17,18, Steps in the formulation of a national mine action strategy with donor collaboration
19
but GOM in the driving seat, based on an accurate needs assessment
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